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Abstract
The United Nations Organisation (UN) is best endowed to conduct preventive 
diplomacy (PD) by preventing disputes and conflicts arising from interstate and 
intrastate relationships. The UN has the means to prevent such conflicts and 
disputes from emerging and escalating into armed confrontation. This article 
examines the challenges faced by the United Nations as it practises PD with 
specific reference to Africa. The Charter of the UN sets out the legal basis of PD 
for the UN, and for regional and sub-regional organisations. Contributions of 
four UN Secretary-Generals on matters of PD are examined, and special note is 
taken of the way in which the current Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, uses 
a four-pronged approach to matters of PD in Africa. The UN has performed 
well in PD in Africa, especially in collaboration with sub-regional organisations. 
While the UN derives its mandate to conduct PD from Articles in its Charter, its 
options are limited to peaceful settlement of disputes, and its action is restricted 
by rules of international law on intervention, especially with regard to the 
prohibition of the use of force. The UN is challenged by its inherent problems 
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such as its structures, and its lack of early warning systems and finances. 
Challenges arising from the principle of state sovereignty also limit the UN in 
preventing internal problems, especially at the pre-conflict stages. This article 
concludes by proposing that strengthening the Secretary-General’s good offices, 
enhancing conflict early warning systems and encouraging the international 
community to work together could give legitimacy to UN preventive diplomacy 
endeavours. Fundamentally, the realisation that violent political problems 
require political solutions is instrumental in order for the UN to play its PD role.
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Introduction
With the end of the Cold War era, it was expected that both interstate and intrastate 
conflicts would decline. The end of the Cold War reduced the typical East-West 
ideological competitions that often instigated both intrastate and interstate 
disputes. Surprisingly though, these crises and conflicts are not disappearing 
as much as multiplying, and evolving in different forms. Immediately after 
the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, there was an upsurge in United Nations 
(UN) involvement in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking, and even 
reconstruction of war-ravaged states. These activities placed constraints on the 
UN budget and resources. The UN burden of trying to contain conflicts is made 
heavier by global financial crises, a sense of international fatigue and the massive 
cost of activities around the aftermath of conflicts. 
At the UN, there is always the need for better-tailored cost-effective options for 
dealing with crises. The increase in conflicts and the post-Cold War demands 
on the UN resources call for a changed approach in dealing with crises. This 
requires a review of practices and a need to consider preventive measures and 
identify the most appropriate entry point in the conflict cycle. This is the point 
at which preventive diplomacy (PD) and mediation can begin to play a critical 
role. In this role, the UN is rebalancing its capabilities so that diplomats and 
mediators can be mobilised as the first responders.
This article, therefore, examines the efforts the UN has taken in averting conflicts 
through PD, and the challenges that arose. It concentrates more on post-Cold 
War PD experiences with regard to conflicts in Africa. This objective is achieved 
by considering the basis of PD in the UN system and an overview of it during 
the tenure of four Secretary-Generals. The article further examines the options 
the UN has relating to PD, and its cooperation with regional organisations 
with regard to their arrangements and their involvement in PD in Africa. The 
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challenges to the UN in fulfilling its PD role, the way forward and conclusions 
make up the final sections.
The basis of preventive diplomacy in the United Nations 
system
The concept of preventive diplomacy has proven to be controversial (Lund 
1996). However, there appears to be consensus that PD is preventive diplomatic 
and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of the involved 
parties. It helps to prevent disputes and conflicts, which could potentially pose a 
threat to regional peace and stability, from arising between states. PD also helps 
prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; 
and can therefore help to minimise their impact (Seventh ASEAN Regional 
Forum 2000). A great deal of academic work has been done within this broad 
definition of PD, and various concepts have been suggested.
Since the creation of the UN in 1945, over 112 major conflicts around the world 
have left more than 25 million people dead. The UN was rendered powerless in 
preventing many of these crises because of the vetoes cast during the Cold War 
by the Security Council, which represented a vivid expression of the divisions of 
that period (Barnett et al. 2007). After the end of the Cold War, there have been 
fewer vetoes, and the demands on the United Nations for averting conflicts have 
surged. The UN Security Council has emerged as a central instrument for the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace and security. 
In practising PD, the UN seeks to identify, at the earliest possible stage, situations 
that could lead to conflict, and thereafter tries through diplomacy to remove the 
sources of danger before the outbreak of violence. Where conflict erupts, the 
UN engages in activities aimed at resolving the issues causing disagreement and 
works to restore peace. However fragile the conflict situation is, where fighting 
has been halted, the UN assists in implementing agreements achieved by 
the peacemakers.
The UN stands ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts, including 
rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and 
strife, as well as building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations 
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formerly at war. Largely, it addresses the deepest causes of conflict, especially 
economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to 
discern an increasingly common moral perspective that spans the world's 
nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international law, with 
many attributing its genesis to the work of the UN (Barnett et al. 2007).
Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping peace lies the 
responsibility of bringing hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for 
the resolution of conflict (United Nations 1945). The processes of peacemaking 
have also been the subject of various resolutions and declarations of the General 
Assembly, including resolution A/RES/47/120 on An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
diplomacy and related matters (Boutros-Ghali 1995a). The United Nations has 
had wide experience in the application of these peaceful means. If conflicts 
have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were 
unknown or inadequate. The fault lies in the lack of political will of the parties to 
seek a solution to their differences through such means as suggested in Chapter 
VI of the Charter, and the lack of leverage at the disposal of a third party, if 
this is the procedure chosen. The indifference of the international community 
to a problem, or the marginalisation of it, can also thwart the possibilities 
of solution.
Peacemaking at times is facilitated by international action to ameliorate 
circumstances that have contributed to the dispute or conflict. If, for instance, 
assistance to displaced persons within a country is of priority, then the United 
Nations draws upon the resources of all agencies and programmes concerned 
(Luard 1994). The main challenge lies in the diversity of the UN agencies and the 
time required to activate the implementation of the principles concerned. The 
bureaucracy at the UN often delays the possibility of responding appropriately 
and on time. In circumstances when peacemaking requires the imposition of 
sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter, it is important that states confronted 
with special economic problems do not only have the right to consult the 
Security Council regarding such problems, as Article 50 provides, but also have 
a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed.
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In Africa, however, where international borders are porous and state organs 
are sometimes not in control, enforcing sanctions is extremely difficult (Opiyo 
2010a). The use of military force is the essence of the concept of collective 
security. According to the UN Charter, if peaceful means fail, the measures 
provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, 
to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of ‘any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ (United Nations 1945: Art 
39). So far, the Security Council has not made use of the most coercive of these 
measures in Africa,1 that is, the action by military force foreseen in Article 42. 
The Charter, however, provides a detailed approach on how this can be done.
An overview of preventive diplomacy at the United Nations
Various UN Secretary-Generals have had constructive and focused agendas for 
preventive diplomacy. The following are samples of the positions taken by UN 
Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan 
and Ban Ki-moon on preventive diplomacy. 
During the leadership of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary-General, the 
United Nations was expected to be a dynamic instrument enabling member state 
governments to develop forms of anticipatory action before a crisis boiled over, 
that is, through ‘preventive diplomacy’. For Hammarskjöld, the purpose of the 
UN was to create conditions where each main military block could have adequate 
space to work with others. Hammarskjöld performed preventive diplomacy 
personally or through senior staff of specialised agencies and programmes, 
through the Security Council or the General Assembly, or through regional 
organisations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy 
was regarded as requiring specific measures to create confidence, early warnings 
based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; and, in 
some situations, also preventive deployment (Djibom 2008:4).
Just like Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali positively 
considered PD. Boutros-Ghali regarded PD as ‘the most desirable and efficient 




employment of diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict or if 
conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes’ 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995a: para 23). Like Hammarskjöld, Boutros-Ghali performed 
preventive diplomacy personally or through senior staff of specialised agencies 
and programmes, the Security Council or the General Assembly, or regional 
organisations in cooperation with the United Nations (Boutros-Ghali 1995a).
As UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan too had a special place for PD. In 2001, 
he proposed renaming ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘preventive action’. For him, 
preventive diplomacy was particularly favoured by member states as a means 
of preventing human suffering and as an alternative to costly political-military 
operations to resolve conflicts after they have occurred. Although diplomacy 
is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, the United Nations’ experience in 
recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that could 
have useful preventive results. For instance, preventive deployment, preventive 
disarmament, preventive humanitarian action, and preventive peacebuilding, 
which involve the consent of the government or governments concerned, as well 
as a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights, and 
economic and social development. For this reason, Annan decided to rename 
the activity ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘preventive action’. It is of interest to note 
that he emphasised that ‘preventive action’ should be limited mostly to measures 
stated under Chapter VI of the Charter, but also noted that enforcement action 
as provided under Chapter VII must remain a legitimate means of last resort 
in order to prevent massive violations of fundamental human rights or other 
serious threats to peace (Annan 2002).
Ban Ki-moon as the eighth UN Secretary-General, has gone even further 
in presenting preventive diplomacy, specifically for Africa, in the form of a 
four-pronged approach. First, the strengthening of UN partnerships with 
all stakeholders should be continued. Successful peace processes require the 
contributions of a range of actors, at both the regional and international levels. 
The UN has, for example, a political office in Dakar, serving West Africa to forge 
innovative working relations with the African Union and ECOWAS – helping 
to address political crises throughout the sub-region with a model that could 
usefully be replicated elsewhere.
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Second, it should be ensured that developments include the increasing use 
of international contact groups and elders’ structures. Recent engagements 
in Guinea, Niger, the Comoros and Kenya have shown what the UN political 
affairs sector can do. Progress can only be achieved through partnerships that 
yield a combination of influence, impartiality, capacity and capability. Effective 
preventive action depends critically on the willingness of the parties in the 
conflict to engage. The UN understands motives, calculations and incentives 
used to prevent violence between parties in dispute, thus improving the targeting 
actors that it is in their own interest to accept diplomatic assistance to avert 
conflict. Neighbouring countries and sub-regional organisations could exercise 
a unique influence, and perhaps serve as key allies. 
Third, the international community is to continue to invest in prevention. The 
global economic crisis put new pressures on resources, and there is an overall 
trend towards doing more with less. Diplomatic approaches and responses, 
when successful, are highly cost-effective. And fourth, the UN ought to support 
and encourage the role of women in preventive diplomacy. Repeatedly, women 
in Africa and elsewhere have demonstrated a strong commitment in working to 
achieve sustainable peace (Migiro 2010; United Nations News Service 2010:5). 
The Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirms the important role of women 
in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, yet women 
are still underrepresented in the formal stages of conflict prevention (United 
Nations Security Council 2000). 
The role of the UN in preventive diplomacy
Within the confines of the UN Charter, the role of the UN in preventive 
diplomacy includes political action through the Department of Political 
Affairs, peacekeeping operations in the deployment of the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP),2  disarmament, especially of 
nuclear weapons, and human rights action focused on the strengthening of 
respect for human rights while addressing the issues of human rights violations 
2 This has taken place about three times in the last three decades: UNPREDEP in the former 
Republic of Macedonia, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINURCA) and succession operations in Haiti. See, for example, Ackermann 1999.
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whenever they occur. In addition, development assistance, humanitarian action, 
the media, and information dissemination form part of the options available 
to the United Nations. Finally, gender equality has its focus on constitutional, 
legislative, judicial, and electoral reforms. Very important also is the drug 
and crime prevention sector through which the UN addresses illegal business 
activities that are likely to fuel conflict.
The UN engagement in PD is underpinned by intervention. It is therefore 
paramount to reaffirm two fundamental principles of international law 
concerning preventive diplomacy which if not followed would negate the efforts. 
First, is the prohibition of the use of force. A central feature of the modern 
international legal system is the normative attempt to control the use of force 
(Brownlie 1998:105–108). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945) 
prohibits ‘the threat or use of force’. The Charter elaborates a system of economic, 
political, and military enforcement measures against aggression in Chapter VII, 
that is, the collective security system. The monopoly in enforcement power 
was made subject only to two exceptions: the individual or collective right of 
self-defence in Article 51 and enforcement measures by regional organisations 
authorised by the Security Council under Article 53. 
Second, is the peaceful settlement of disputes. Disputes between states arising 
from claims and counter-claims concerning a matter of fact, law or policy are 
an inevitable part of international relations and have frequently led to armed 
conflict. In modern international law, Article 2(3) of the UN Charter obliges 
member states to ‘settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’; 
and Chapter VI of the Charter is entirely devoted to this purpose. However, 
peaceful means cannot be limited to those of Chapter VI.
Preventive diplomacy also needs to be understood in terms of the methods and 
organs or actors. With regard to methods, Boutros-Ghali (1995a) reiterated 
that preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence, that it needs 
early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact 
finding, and that it may also involve preventive deployment as well as, in some 
situations, demilitarised zones. In a supplement to Boutros-Ghali 1995b there 
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is a striking reference to the ‘need for hard decisions’ which include sanctions 
and enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali 
1995b: section 104). Variously, organs or actors have actively played an important 
role in the preventive diplomacy, not only through the United Nations organs, 
but also aided by regional organisations, governments, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), mass media and individuals. In fact, the role of other 
actors other than the United Nations has become increasingly important.
The United Nations’ cooperation with regional 
arrangements
The UN Charter devotes Chapter VIII to cooperation with regional arrangements 
or agencies that are ‘dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’ and are 
existing and acting ‘consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations’ (United Nations 1945: Art 52(1)). The Cold War impaired the proper 
use of UN Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked 
against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the UN Charter. The UN 
Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements 
and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for any action taken by a group of 
states to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action that could contribute 
to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations or 
entities could include treaty-based organisations, whether created before or after 
the founding of the United Nations, regional organisations for mutual security 
and defence, organisations for general regional development or for cooperation 
on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a 
specific political, economic, or social issue of current concern.3 
In Africa, regional and sub-regional arrangements such as the African Union 
(AU), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) have jointly participated with the United 
Nations regarding different conflict situations. In the past, regional arrangements 
3 See United Nations 1945: Chapter VIII for details and specific Articles.
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often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective 
security; thus, their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the 
sense of solidarity required for the UN to be effective. However, in the post-Cold 
War era, regional arrangements or agencies render great services if the activities 
they undertake are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter, and if Chapter VIII governs their relationship with the United Nations, 
particularly with the Security Council.
It is not the purpose of this article to set forth any formal pattern of relationship 
between regional organisations and the United Nations, or to call for any 
specific division of labour. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements 
or agencies in many cases possess potentials that could be utilised in serving 
the functions covering preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has 
and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security. Regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation, 
and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden 
of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus, 
and democratisation in international affairs.
The UN in preventive diplomacy in Africa
The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To effectively deal 
with them requires utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and also to promote sustainable economic and social 
development for wider prosperity. In the past few years, even with the collapse 
of the east-west divide and the end of the Cold War which for decades had 
given rise to distrust and hostility, numerous issues are still growing between 
states of the north and the south. This calls for attention at the highest levels of 
government and for improvement in relations between east and west in order to 
afford new possibilities, some already realised, for successfully meeting threats 
to common security.
In Africa, authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces and 
responsive governments. The form, scope, and intensity of these processes differ 
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in Eastern Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa, but they are sufficiently 
similar to indicate a continental phenomenon. Parallel to these political 
changes, many states are seeking more open forms of economic policy, which 
may create a continent-wide sense of dynamism and movement towards less 
confrontational relationships. Regional and continental associations of states 
are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious 
characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are 
blurred by advanced types of communications and global commerce, and by 
the decisions of states to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common 
political associations such as the AU and sub-regional organisations as IGAD. 
At the same time, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty are 
springing up, and the cohesion of states is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, 
social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand 
by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion, and on the other by acts 
of terrorism seeking to undermine democratic growth and change. This new 
dimension of insecurity obscures the continuing and devastating problems 
of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, 
availability of drugs, and the growing disparity between rich and poor. Poverty, 
disease, famine, oppression and despair abound, combining to produce globally 
17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons and massive migrations 
of peoples within and beyond national borders. These are both sources 
and consequences of conflict that require the continuous attention of the 
United Nations. 
Security developments in Africa continue to cause concern not only to African 
states but also the United Nations. In West and Central Africa in particular, 
the threat that internal conflicts will spread and lead to armed confrontations 
between sovereign African states is a worrying development. For instance, several 
African countries are involved in the ongoing hostilities in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the same sub-region, the UN successfully 
participated in the ONUB mission in Burundi, which culminated in elections.
In Sierra Leone, whose people were victims of one of the most brutal conflicts in 
recent times, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 
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worked assiduously to help facilitate a negotiated solution. In close cooperation 
with ECOWAS, its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and other interested 
member states, UNOMSIL actively supported the process of negotiations 
between the Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which 
led to the signing on 7 July 1999 of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Following the 
signing of the Peace Agreement, the Security Council authorised an expansion 
of UNOMSIL. Recognising the close relationship between the promotion of 
human rights and sustainable peace, UNOMSIL, in collaboration with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), 
continues to monitor and report on human rights abuses in Sierra Leone with 
a view to ending further violations (Kabia 2009). At the time of writing this 
article, Sierra Leone is relatively peaceful and in November 2012, Sierra Leone 
will conduct the second elections after the end of UN peacekeeping. These 
elections, which have often been ‘free and fair’, are a reflection that the UN effort 
towards peacebuilding in Africa is bearing fruits.
The outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 was a cause of 
profound disquiet. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia also had a tragic 
regional impact, particularly with regard to the conflict in Somalia. The United 
Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) continues to assist regional efforts 
at peacemaking led by AMISOM. However, a lack of consensus on the mode of 
power-sharing among the various factions in Somalia has precluded settlement 
of the conflict. There is optimism that the Transitional Federal Government in 
Somalia will conduct free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in 
August 2012 in order to actualise peace in Somalia. The main challenge is to 
strengthen international peacemaking efforts and identify initiatives that can be 
supported by all the relevant actors (Tegegn and Zegeye 2007). 
Following several internal and external consultations, the UN supported 
a successful referendum in South Sudan. The South Sudan situation that 
culminated in the referendum is a classic case where the UN, in collaboration 
with regional and sub-regional organisations, worked to prevent the possibility 
of sliding back into conflict. The common effort was evident as on 9 July 2011 
the Republic of South Sudan became the newest country in the world. In order to 
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prevent the possibility of conflict in Southern Sudan, the UN adopted resolution 
1996 (2011) on 8 July 2011. 
Here, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan 
continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region. The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the 
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) starting from 9 July 2011. UNMISS has an 
elaborate three-pronged mandate. Firstly, to support peace consolidation and 
thereby foster longer-term state building and economic development. Secondly, 
to support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its 
responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and for the 
protection of civilians. And thirdly, to support the Government of the Republic 
of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule 
of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors (S/RES/1996 (2011)). 
Besides the above cases, the United Nations has been involved for many years in 
Western Sahara, where recent consultations with the Government of Morocco 
and the French POLISARIO have finally resolved a longstanding impasse over 
a referendum for self-determination (Thompson and Adloff 1980). While these 
efforts stand out, Africa is not, of course, the only area of security concern for 
the United Nations. 
The UN aims to become better, not only at stabilising countries in conflict 
and easing the suffering such conflicts cause, but at preventing and resolving 
them through political means. Progress towards this end is in the interest of all 
member states, not least, of the United States (US) which has renewed its own 
commitment to diplomacy as an instrument for solving problems in the world 
(Opiyo 2010b). The way the UN managed the Kenyan post-election violence 
of 2007/8 is an outstanding example of the UN taking immediate action. Of 
course, it was the African Union led by Kofi Annan that was at the forefront of 
the mediation effort, but the UN was present earlier on and actively working 
behind the scenes. The UN quickly deployed political officers, and electoral, 
constitutional and security experts who became the main support staff for the 
mediator as Annan helped the parties forge the agreements to end the crisis. Few 
would contest that the prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent 
an even larger catastrophe.
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Another key to success is being on the spot, close to the action and the players’ 
pulse. Anyone who has worked in conflict resolution knows that close proximity 
to the countries and a deep knowledge of the actors are some of the most 
important assets. In Sierra Leone in 2009, for example, the head of the UN 
political mission literally scampered to the roof of a building in Freetown to 
defuse a situation that could have triggered a relapse into conflict. He brokered a 
political agreement that helped to keep the country’s hard-fought peace process 
on track. The Sierra Leone mission is actually called a peacebuilding mission, 
as are those in Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and the Central African Republic. They 
were deployed to help guide the peace after internal violent conflicts. The West 
Africa-focused envoy based in Dakar has played a very helpful role along with 
ECOWAS and AU mediators and governments, including the United States and 
France, in responding to coups and electoral crises throughout the region. At the 
latest count, the UN principal staff officer in Dakar has travelled to Guinea 38 
times in the past two years, working to keep the political transition on track. The 
UN is not very successful yet, but Guinea could still become a prime example of 
preventive diplomacy, saving the UN from another terrible and costly conflict.
Challenges to the United Nations preventive diplomacy role
This section presents general challenges and specifically those related to UN 
intervention in disputes and conflicts. There is a chasm between the tasks 
entrusted to the UN and the financial means provided. The truth of the matter 
is that the UN vision cannot really extend to prospective opportunities as long 
as financing remains myopic. There are two main areas of concern: the ability 
to function over the longer term and the immediate requirements to respond 
to a crisis. The United Nations is currently facing chronic underfunding and 
understaffing, especially in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which 
manages UN peacemaking activities globally.
Closely related to this is the issue of logistics. In the case of peacekeeping, for 
example, not all governments can provide their battalions with the equipment 
they need for service in conflict environments. While some equipment is 
provided by troop-contributing countries during peacekeeping, a great deal has 
to come from the United Nations, including kits to fill gaps in under-equipped 
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national battalions. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. 
They must be procured from manufacturers, which create several difficulties. 
This is a major challenge. It is essential, therefore, for the UN to consider a pre-
positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment so that at least some vehicles, 
communications equipment, and generators, would be immediately available at 
the start of an operation (Cuny 1991). In the recent past, a conviction has grown, 
among nations large and small, that the UN can achieve the great objectives 
of the Charter, and be a United Nations capable of maintaining international 
peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in 
the words of the Charter ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom’ (United Nations 1945: Preamble).
The UN also faces other obstacles in the way of increasing the scope and 
effectiveness of its action in preventive diplomacy. First, governments and 
leaders engaged in conflict sometimes do not want UN help. Early involvement 
is often essential to the success of PD, but parties to conflicts often are not 
willing to admit they have a problem until the conflict has escalated beyond 
their control. They may contemplate avoiding legitimatising an adversary or 
‘internationalising’ their problem by keeping the UN away or wrongly believing 
that UN involvement will quickly lead to the unwelcome presence of a large 
peacekeeping force or to Security Council sanctions. Second, there is the challenge 
relating to UN personnel professionalism, for effective preventive diplomacy 
and mediation is not only about being there and being fast, it is also about being 
good at what the UN does. Success requires more than simply naming a top 
envoy and starting up the process. On the contrary, mediation is a complex and 
increasingly professionalised field. Envoys need more than their own wisdom to 
guide them. What is lacking in the UN system is a means of developing standard 
guidance and training for mediators and their staff, distilling the best lessons 
from others’ experience and debriefing UN envoys at the completion of their 
assignments to find out more about what works and what does not (Bercovitch 
and Houston 1996). 
Modesty and patience are paramount in any discussion of the success of 
preventive diplomacy. Progress aside, the United Nations and the international 
community as a whole have a long way to go before they can reliably predict 
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conflict, prevent it, and respond effectively. Some drivers of conflict, including 
the existence of economic and social disparities, and the unpredictable whims 
of ineffective leaders, are beyond the immediate reach of preventive diplomacy.
In particular, there are certain challenges associated with the pre-conflict 
situation that are worth discussing. The key challenges to the United Nations, 
more so in the initial stages of conflict, include the fact that attention to pending 
or emerging problems is usually side-tracked by highly visible emergencies, 
actual war and violence. It always attracts much greater attention and a bigger 
share of the available resources. Normally, domestic support for measures 
addressing pending or emerging problems at home or abroad take a back seat to 
those that address highly visible emergencies (Adams 1994:48). The principle of 
state sovereignty limits external involvement in the prevention or resolution of 
internal problems, especially at the pre-conflict stages. Although it might already 
be known that the impending outbreak of war in a state is imminent and that 
certain things can be done to reverse the situation and correct the problems that 
may eventually lead to violence, states are protected from external interventions 
by the principle of sovereignty. The relatively limited access to intelligence and 
fact-finding missions impedes early warning and analysis of risk assessment, 
hence the delay in timely intervention. There may be lots of early warning, but 
such warnings are often not matched with proposals for feasible and promising 
preventive measures. 
Another challenge is the definite lack of coherence and coordination between 
and within relevant non-state, state, and interstate actors who could implement 
preventive measures. Even if limited cooperation takes place, it does so in the 
context of a poor understanding of the situation, and poor coordination based 
on the comparative advantage of cooperating actors. Nevertheless, there is also 
the difficulty in cooperating with and assisting local communities (Kennan 
1996). Similarly, there is no commonly accepted legal definition of intervention 
in a pre-conflict situation. There is simply no agreement on when, how, why and 
by whom intervention should be undertaken. The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) has a comprehensive and impressive 
study on ‘the responsibility to protect’. The problem with intervention is its 
acceptance. Most states believe that intervention must be the exception to the rule 
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of non-interference, and can only to be applied if there is a clear international 
consensus on the necessity for external involvement in the solution of 
domestic crises.
Strengthening UN preventive diplomacy
The presence of the UN and the Secretary-General's good offices continue to play 
an important role in preventive diplomacy efforts. A vital option in this regard is 
the strengthening of the Mediation Support Office and Early Warning Capacity 
(MSOEWC) within the Department of Political Affairs which has the ability to 
provide better coordination, communication, support, and guidance. With this 
in mind, the African Union has always striven to deepen its partnership with the 
United Nations on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The UN efforts towards a strategic partnership with the African 
Union in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent is informed 
by the reality that regional organisations have a comparative advantage in 
confronting such challenges within their regions. 
The success of preventive diplomacy depends not only on an effective early 
warning mechanism, but also on the involvement of non-state actors. For 
instance, community-based organisations have demonstrated time and again 
that they can partner with governments and the international community in 
providing early warning support and in acting proactively and decisively to 
prevent potential conflict situations (Krasno 2005). Preventive diplomacy 
is a good example of the international community working together for 
lasting peace and sustainable development. The most desirable and efficient 
employment of preventive diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in 
conflict or, if conflict does break out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its 
underlying causes. 
In addition, mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the 
likelihood of conflict between states and communities. Many such measures 
are available to governments that have the will to employ them. Examples of 
important measures of preventive diplomacy are: the systematic exchange of 
military missions; formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centres; 
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and arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of 
regional arms agreements.
Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts. 
Beyond this, an understanding of developments and continental trends, based 
on sound analysis, is required and the willingness to take appropriate preventive 
action is essential. Given the economic and social roots of many potential 
conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations must encompass 
economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to 
dangerous tensions. An increased resort to fact-finding is needed, in accordance 
with the UN Charter, initiated either by the Secretary-General, to enable him 
to meet his responsibilities under the Charter, including Article 99, or by the 
Security Council or the General Assembly. Various forms may be employed 
selectively as the situation requires. A request by a state to send a United Nations 
fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered without undue delay. 
Formal fact-finding can be mandated by the Security Council or by the General 
Assembly, either of which may elect to send a mission under its immediate 
authority or may invite the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, 
including the designation of a special envoy. 
Conclusion
The employment of PD is critical for international peace and security. However, 
its functionality has to take cognisance of the fact that at the root of most conflicts 
that may turn violent, or perhaps already have, are political problems requiring 
political solutions. Preventive diplomacy interventions can provide breathing 
space from the bloodshed, but they rarely settle the underlying differences that 
drive conflict, such as ethnic and religious questions or disparities of wealth and 
power. Is there any doubt, for example, that security gains alone will not put Sudan 
and Somalia on a stable footing for the future? Alternatively, that the challenges 
to peace in Somalia are largely political in nature? Distrust among national 
actors in conflict often runs so deep that they are unable to arrive at necessary 
compromises without help in the form of international mediation, facilitation 
or diplomatic encouragement. To those problems, the UN, as the universal 
organisation, brings a special legitimacy, impartiality and real competence to 
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the table. Nevertheless, more importantly, there is a place for political action 
before, during, and after a conflict. Ideally, the UN needs to prevent violence 
from erupting in the first place. However, if that fails, robust diplomacy and 
mediation is still required to end the fighting through negotiations and then to 
help countries navigate the difficult politics of reconciliation and rebuilding. 
Therefore, even though the practice of preventive diplomacy is challenged in 
Africa, it still stands out as the best option the international community can give 
to address instability arising from conflicts and disputes in Africa.
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